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as it charge h 
an as a sex offender) which occurred wholly in another 
State responds by arguing that he had to register either in the other state or in 
Idaho, and therefore, the State could still prosecute him. However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has already essentially rejected that argument. The reasons the Supreme Court 
rejected that argument are consistent with the plain language of Idaho's statutes and 
the fundamental principles of jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, this Court should also 
reject the State's argument. Since the Indictment was jurisdictionally-defective for 
falling to allege a criminal act occurring in Idaho, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying Mr. Villafuerte's motion to dismiss the indictment remand this 
case for of an order of dismissal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Villafuerte's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
2 
State's argument on appeal boils down to a single point - that "changes in 
information that an offender is obligated to update under I.C. § 18-8309(1) must be 
to the countv sheriff or to an official in another state, if that state requires 
J 
registration." (Resp. Br., p.6.) Therefore, the State contends, Idaho can prosecute the 
to register even if the registrant has moved out of the State of Idaho. (Resp. 
, pp.6-7.) That argument runs contrary to basic principles of law embodied in Idaho's 
statutes and the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court on this topic. Therefore, this 
Court should reject the State's argument. 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has already essentially rejected the State's 
argument. See State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561-62 (2012). In that 
Court vacated a conviction for failure to register, explaining: 
the Supreme 
The State contends that the evidence in the record beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Lee violated I.C. § 18-8309 because it proves that 
he moved from his last known address without providing notice of a new 
address or actual residence. This argument fails because (1) I.C. § 18-
8309 does not apply to changes of address or actual residence to other 
countries and (2) the State never proved that Lee moved to a new address 
or actual residence in Idaho. 
Lee, 153 Idaho at 561 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the State attempts to 
distinguish Lee, but it only discusses the first reason vacated that 
conviction. (See Resp. Br., p.11 n.4.) It argues that, since the Supreme Court's 
decision was based on the lack of the word "country" in the relevant version of the 
statute, "the Court implicitly found that the evidence would have been sufficient if the 
state had shown that Lee established residence another leaving the 
3 
" 1 n is 
" 
(emphasis . Thus, as Villafuerte explained in his initial brief, 
reveals that were two implicit conclusions within the Lee decision: that 
the duty to report under the SORA statute when a registrant moves out of Idaho only 
exits in the state to which the defendant moved, and that there was no resid duty to 
notify Idaho that he had moved out of the State of Idaho. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) Were 
either of those two conclusions not part of the decision, there would be no need for the 
State to prove the defendant moved to a new residence "in Idaho." See id. Therefore, 
even if the prosecution had shown the defendant in Lee had moved to another state, the 
conviction would still have been vacated under the second rationale. See id. 
In this case, the State has effectively conceded in its Respondent's Brief that 
is no evidence that Mr. Villafuerte moved to a new address or in the 
State of Idaho: "[Mr.] Villafuerte did not report to the jail, or return to his registered 
address, but instead absconded to Nevada and was later arrested in Utah." (Resp. 
Br., p.1; see also R., p.55 (the district court pointing out that both parties submitted that 
Mr. Villafuerte had left the State of Idaho, not moved within it).) Since the State has not 
offered any proof that Mr. Villafuerte "moved to a new address or actual residence in 
Idaho," his conviction, like the conviction in Lee, should be vacated. 
Basically, what Lee recognizes is that there are jurisdictional limitations in Idaho's 
judicial system - for the courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case, 
an essential element of the criminal act must have occurred in Idaho. See Lee, 153 
4 
a 19-
." Doyle, 121 913-14. By noting the defendant must have moved "in 
Idaho," the Supreme Court essentially recognized that no essential element of failure to 
register occurs Idaho if the registrant moves out of the state. That means State is 
arguing for an expansion of prosecutorial jurisdiction to allow prosecution of acts wholly 
occurring outside the State Idaho, and so, interpretation would a direct 
between those statutes. As a result, that argument should be rejected. 
To help explain his analysis on this point, Mr. Villafuerte directed this Court to 
several decisions by the United States Supreme Court which discussed statutes that, 
like SORA, designate a location for the established duty to be performed. 
(See App. Br., pp.10-17.) Supreme Court provided a detailed 
statutes within the context of jurisdiction and venue, concluding that the 
authority to prosecute for failure to perform the established duty only in the 
jurisdiction where the duty was supposed to have been performed. (See App. 
Br., pp.10-17.) 
In response, the State contends those cases are not relevant because 
Mr. Villafuerte's claim is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and "the plain language of 
[I.C. § 19-301 (2)] indicates 'venue is nonjurisdictional."' (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) That 
argument ignores the language of subsection 1 of that same statute, which begins: 
"Jurisdiction - venue." I.C. § 19-301 (1 ). Therefore, the language of the statute, read as 
5 
is as as 
as a 
fails to is the dual meaning term "jurisdiction" 
- the term "jurisdiction" can specifically to personal and subject 
jurisdiction, or it can generally refer to "a court's authority to take certain action or 
grant a certain type of relief." State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Mr. Villafuerte's challenge in this case is that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because the Indictment did not allege a crime that actually occurred 
in the State of Idaho. (R., pp.37-42.) Idaho Code§ 19-301 recognizes that the analysis 
of whether the act occurred in Idaho incorporates aspects of venue. I.C. § 19-301(1). 
that end, it provides that only occurring in Idaho may criminally charged in 
Idaho's courts, and that the modicum of proof necessary to establish whether the act 
in Idaho is a of § 19-301. Ultimately, 
not occur in Idaho, the act is not prosecutable Idaho I.C. § 19-
301 (1 ), and so, Idaho's courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
Thus, while venue is not equivalent to jurisdiction (i.e., it is "nonjurisdictional"), aspects 
of venue are relevant within certain jurisdictional analyses. Therefore the State's first 
argument to distinguish the Supreme Court's venue discussions is meritless. 
The same is true of the State's second contention - that those opinions are not 
controlling, in that they do not discuss the jurisdictional limitations of Idaho's SORA 
statute specifically. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) Mr. Villafuerte has not contended that those 
cases are controlling in that regard, but rather, has argued that their analysis helps 
6 
in case. in 
a is 
to which the registrant is moving. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a); compare Doe v. State, 
1 Idaho 778 (2015) (noting that Idaho's registration requirements would control if and 
the petitioner was sufficiently employed in Idaho despite the different registration 
requirements applicable to him in his home state of Washington). Thus, like in the 
Supreme Court's cases, any authority to prosecute for not fulfilling that duty lies only in 
jurisdiction in which the duty is to be performed. 
Besides, rare indeed would be the cases that are factually identical. As such, 
Idaho's courts have often examined how other courts have handled similar issues, 
particularly when they are examining an issue that has not been fully explored by 
Idaho's courts or when a court in another jurisdiction has engaged in a particularly 
of the issue. See, e.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 
92 (2003) ("Our decision is in accord with the vast weight of persauasive authority 
jurisdictions."); State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 703 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We find 
reasoning fo the Massachusetts Court of Appeals persuasive."). The State does 
not criticize the United States Surpeme Court's analysis of this issue. (See generally 
Resp. Br.) Thus, this Court may properly consider that anlaysis in understanding how a 
similar issue under Idaho's statutes should be resolved. Since the person who moves 
out of Idaho is only obligated to act in the jurisdiction to which he is moving, prosecution 
for failing to perform that duty is improper in Idaho. Compare Lee, 153 Idaho at 561-62. 
7 
in an 
I. 1 a 
. § 18-8309(2) unambiguously relieved an of the duty to register annually in 
once the offender moved another State." State v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5488655, 
(Ct App. 2013). The State contends that this Court should not look to the discussion 
in Wilson because the opinion is unpublished, and so, cannot be relied on as precedent. 
(Resp. Br., p.10 n.2.) Mr. Villafuerte has already explained that Wilson is not cited as 
precedent. (App. Br., p.17 n.8.) Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has approved: 
"When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions 
because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the presentation 
of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[e].' Likewise, we find the hearing 
officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an 
example, was appropriate." Staff of Idaho Real Comm'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 
630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)). Thus, 
referencing an unpublished opinion as a historical example of how a learned court has 
analyzed the particular question at issue in this case is appropriate, and that is all 
Mr. Villafuerte has asked this Court do with the discussion of this question in Wilson. 
(App. Br., p.17.) 
The State also attempts to distinguish this of analysis by pointing out that the 
defendant in Wilson was charged under a different section of the SORA statute than 
Mr. Villafuerte. (Resp. Br., p.10 n.2.) The State's argument is unavailing because the 




a . '' I § 1 11(1) . 
SORA also unambiguously relieves the registrant of his duty under 
statute in Idaho if he moves of "If the offender intends to reside in another 
jurisdiction, the offender shall register in the other jurisdiction within two (2) days of 
moving to that jurisdiction and will not be removed from the sexual offender registry in 
Idaho until registration in another jurisdiction is complete." Idaho Code§ 18-8307(4)(a) 
(emphasis added); see also I.C. § 18-8306(5)(c) (requiring the state to notify the 
registrant "of the requirement to register in a new jurisdiction within two (2) days .... ").) 
Thus, while Idaho's records will still reflect the defendant's status as a sex 
offender until he meets his duty to register in that other state, his duty is still to register 
"in the other jurisdiction." LC. § 18-8307(4)(a). Since statutes are to be construed as a 
once Villafuerte to out of the State of Idaho, regardless of what 
of information the State believes he needs to report, 1 he was relieved that duty to 
provide that information to Idaho; his duty was to provide that information to the new 
jurisdiction. Compare Lee, 153 Idaho 561-62 (hoiding that, absent evidence that the 
1 The State contends that, in addition to not updating his information as required by 
I.C. § 18-8309(1 ), Mr. Villafuerte also violated LC. § 18-8309(2) (requiring the registrant 
to notify the jurisdiction of a lodging lasting more than seven days regardless of whether 
that lodging would be considered a residence). (Resp. Br., p.6 n.1.) However, the 
decision in Lee demonstrates that to be an erroneous position as well, as the Idaho 
Supreme Court assumed that the defendant had "travelled through one or more states 
before leaving the United States, he would not necessarily have had an address in any 
of those states," and yet, it still vacated his conviction. Lee, 153 Idaho at 562. Thus, 
the jurisdiction the registrant would be required to notify under I.C. § 18-8309(2) would 
be the one he was obligated to report to in general. In cases such as this, that is the 
new jurisdiction to which the registrant moved. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a). 
9 
a new "a was 
case is 
and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lee, this Court should reject the 
attempts to justify the invasion of another state's sovereignty by allowing it 
prosecute an act which occurred wholly in that other state. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Villafuerte respectfuliy requests this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss and remand this case for entry of an order of dismissal. 
DATED 12th day of January, 2016. 
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